

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

ACDA-05 /031 W

----- 014052

P R 031101Z MAY 75

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2597

INFO USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0196

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DRAFT NAC STATEMENT FOR MAY 7 CONSULTATION (SALT TWO-647)

REF: STATE 100710

1. TRANSMITTED BELOW IS THE DRAFT TEXT OF MY STATEMENT TO BE
GIVEN TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DURING THE CONSULTATION
SCHEDULED FOR MAY 7, 1975.
QUOTE

DRAFT STATEMENT
BY
AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, MAY 7, 1975

I

1. I AM PLEASED TO MEET WITH YOU ONCE AGAIN TO CONTINUE
OUR REGULAR CONSULTATIONS ON SALT. AS YOU MAY KNOW, THE UNITED
STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE AGREED ON A BRIEF WORKING RECESS,
TO LAST FROM MAY UNTIL THE FIRST WEEK IN JUNE. OUR LAST PLENARY
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SESSION PRIOR TO THE RECESS WAS HELD THIS MORNING.

2. TODAY I WILL DISCUSS WITH YOU THE DEVELOPMENTS IN GENEVA SINCE AMBASSADOR BRUCE CIRCULATED HIS LETTER REPORT ON SALT TO THE COUNCIL ON APRIL 4. I WILL ALSO COVER IN SOMEWHAT MORE DETAIL THAN WAS DONE IN THAT REPORT THE EVENTS THAT OCCURRED PRIOR TO APRIL 4.

II

3. IN MY LAST APPEARANCE HERE ON FEBRUARY 24, I OUTLINED THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET DRAFT TEXT OF FEBRUARY 1. I WILL NOW DESCRIBE THE PRINCIPAL POINTS OF THE U.S. DRAFT TEXT WHICH THE U. S.

DELEGATION TABLED ON MARCH 5. FIRST, I WOULD POINT OUT THAT OUR DRAFT IS SOMEWHAT MORE DETAILED THAN THE SOVIET DRAFT. OUR TEXT IS A SELF-CONTAINED DOCUMENT, AS OPPOSED TO THE SOVIET TEXT WHICH IN A NUMBER OF INSTANCES REQUIRES REFERENCE TO OTHER DOCUMENTS IN ORDER TO BE UNDERSTOOD.

4. YOU WILL RECALL THAT UNDER THE VALDIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING OF NOVEMBER, 1974, THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION AGREED THAT EACH SIDE WOULD BE PERMITTED TO DEPLOY AN EQUAL NUMBER-2,400- OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS, I.E. ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS, AND AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES (ASM) OF RANGES OVER 600 KMS IF DEPLOYED ON BOMBERS. BASED ON THE VALDIDVOSTOK DISCUSSIONS, THE U.S. INTERPRETATION OF THIS PROVISION IS THAT ONLY BALLISTIC ASM'S ARE TO BE INCLUDED AND CRUISE MISSILES ARE NOT. ACCORDINGLY, THE U.S. DRAFT OF MARCH 5 CONTAINS A BASIC PROVISION LIMITING ICBM, SLBM, AND AIR-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILE (ASBM) LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS TO AN AGGREGATE NUMBER NOT TO EXCEED 2,400. IN ADDITION THE DRAFT SETS FORTH RELEVANT DEFINITIONS, INCLUDING THOSE FOR THE WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN THE 2,400 AGGREGATE, FOR A MIRV SYSTEM, AND FOR A HEAVY ICBM. IT ALSO CONTAINS RULES SPECIFYING EXACTLY WHEN AND HOW EACH SYSTEM IN THE AGGREGATE WOULD BE COUNTED. THE DRAFT INCLUDES THE BASIC 1,320 AGGREGATE LIMIT ON LAUNCHERS FOR ICBM'S, SLBM'S AND ASBM'S EQUIPPED WITH MIRV SYSTEMS, AND IN ADDITION A PROTOCOL SETTING FORTH DETAILED PROVISIONS RELATING TO MIRV VERIFICATION.

5. OUR DRAFT ALSO CONTAINS PROVISIONS CARRYING OVER THE SUBSTANCE OF ARTICLES I AND II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT-THAT
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IS, A BAN ON CONSTRUCTION OF ADDITIONAL FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS AND A BAN ON CONVERSION OF LAUNCHERS FOR "NON-HEAVY" ICBM'S TO LAUNCHERS FOR "HEAVY" ICBM'S. IT ALSO CONTAINS A PROVISION TO LIMIT THE MAXIMUM VOLUME AND THROW-WEIGHT OF "HEAVY" ICBM'S. IMPORTANTLY, THE DRAFT CONTAINS A RPROVISION FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS TO BEGIN AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE FOLLOWING ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT. FINALLY, IT CONTAINS ARTICLES RELATIVE TO NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION AND TO THE RESPON-

SIBILITIES OF THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION AS WELL AS
STANDARD PROVISIONS ON AMENDMENTS AND WITHDRAWALS.

6. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS OPPOSED THOSE SUBSTANTIVE
PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. TEXT WHICH DO NOT CORRESPOND TO THEIR
INTERPRETATION OF THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING. FOR EXAMPLE,
THEY PROPOSE THAT SYSTEMS TO BE COUNTED WITHIN THE 2,400
AGGREGATE INCLUDE AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES (ASM'S) OF "ANY TYPE",
NOT JUST AIR-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILES. THEY ALSO PROPOSE
A BAN ON EQUIPPING AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN BOMBERS WITH ASM'S HAVING
A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS. SIGNIFICANTLY, THEY HAVE
OPPOSED ANY DEFINITION OF A "HEAVY" ICBM, AS WELL AS THE UPPER
LIMIT ON THE VOLUME AND THROW-WEIGHT OF "HEAVY" ICBM'S, AND
THEY HAVE REJECTED A NUMBER OF U.S. PROPOSED PROVISIONS RELATING
TO MIRV VERIFICATION INCLUDING THE ENTIRE CONTENTS OF THE PROTOCOL.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0196

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III

7. AS WE ANTICIPATED, TWO MAJOR ISSUES WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED
IN GENEVA OVER THE LAST THREE MONTHS ARE THE QUESTION OF SYSTEMS
TO BE INCLUDED IN THE AGGREGATE AND THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION
OF THIS MORE COMPLEX AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY AS IT RELATES TO MIRV'S.

8. CONCERNING SYSTEMS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE AGGREGATE, WE HAVE EMPHASIZED THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS OUR POSITION THAT THE BACKFIRE BOMBER HAS THE CAPABILITY OF A HEAVY BOMBER. THE SOVIET POSITION IS THAT THE BACKFIRE IS A MEDIUM BOMBER, AND THEY ARE UNWILLING EVEN TO DISCUSS ITS CAPABILITIES. A SECOND ISSUE IS THAT OF HEAVY ICBM'S. I HAVE REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT LIMITATIONS ON HEAVY ICBM'S MUST BE CLEARLY SPELLED OUT IN THE NEW AGREEMENT, SINCE THEY HAVE THE GREATEST DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF ANY OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO BE LIMITED BY THE NEW AGREEMENT. THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE SOVIET SIDE, ON THE CONTRARY, IS THAT CARRYING FORWARD ARTICLES I AND II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IS SUFFICIENT TO RESOLVE ISSUES RELEVANT TO HEAVY ICBM'S.

9. WITH RESPECT TO VERIFICATION, THE SOVIETS STATE THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, BY THEMSELVES, ARE SUFFICIENT. WE
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ACCEPT THE FACT THAT VERIFICATION MUST BE THROUGH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS; BUT, AS I NOTED HERE IN FEBRUARY, THE NEW AGREEMENT WILL BE BROADER AND MORE COMPLEX, AND THEREFORE WE HAVE MAINTAINED THAT IT MUST CONTAIN PROVISIONS WHICH ASSURE THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS CAN IN PRACTICE ASSURE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE. WE HAVE POINTED OUT TO THE SOVIETS IN BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL MEETINGS THE PROBLEMS WHICH WE PERCEIVE IN THIS AREA. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS BEEN WILLING TO DISCUSS THE MATTER AND SEVERAL APPROACHES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED, BUT NONE HAS BEEN AGREED. THUS THE SITUATION IS STILL IN A PRELIMINARY STAGE AND IT WOULD THEREFORE BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR ME TO GO INTO THE MATTER IN MORE DETAIL.

IV

10. ON THE QUESTION OF WHAT THE SOVIETS CALL "FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS" (FBS), THE RESULT OF THE VLADIVOSTOK MEETING WAS, AS YOU KNOW, THAT SUCH SYSTEMS ARE IN NO WAY TO BE LIMITED BY THE NEW AGREEMENT AND THERE IS TO BE NO COMPENSATION FOR FBS NOR FOR THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS IN THE NEW AGREEMENT.

11. THE SOVIETS PROPOSED IN THEIR FEBRUARY 1 DRAFT TEXT, HOWEVER, THAT THE SIDES SHOULD IN THE NEAR FUTURE CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF REDUCING FBS, AS WELL AS QUESTIONS CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES. ON MARCH 21, I ADVISED THE SOVIETS THAT I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO INFORM THEM THAT THEIR PROPOSAL WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD AND THAT WE COULD NOT AGREE TO ITS INCLUSION IN THE NEW AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THERE IS OBVIOUSLY NOTHING WE CAN DO IN THIS AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE THE SOVIETS FROM RAISING THE ISSUE IN SOME SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATION.

12. CONCERNING NON-TRANSFER, THE SOVIET DRAFT CONTAINS A PROVISION THAT THE SIDES WOULD UNDERTAKE NOT TO TRANSFER STRATEGIC

OFFENSIVE ARMS TO OTHER STATES, AND WOULD NOT ASSIST IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT, IN PARTICULAR, BY TRANSFERRING COMPONENTS, TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OR BLUEPRINTS FOR THOSE ARMS. AS IN THE PAST, WE HAVE ADVISED THE SOVIET SIDE THAT WE CANNOT CONSIDER NON-TRANSFER UNTIL THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE AGREEMENT HAVE BEEN DECIDED AND IT IS CLEAR AS TO EXACTLY WHAT SYSTEMS ARE TO BE LIMITED. I, OF COURSE, FULLY RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE THE COUNCIL ATTACHES TO THE NON-TRANSFER QUESTION AND AGAIN WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT THIS
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MATTER WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF CONSULTATION IN THE COUNCIL AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME.

V

13 TURNING NOW TO THE ACTUAL DRAFTING OF THE TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, I BELIEVE WE HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS. A U.S./SOVIET DRAFTING GROUP HAS COMPLETED A PRELIMINARY JOINT DRAFT TEXT, WHICH WAS TABLED BY BOTH SIDES, AD REFERENDUM TO HEADS OF DELEGATION, AT THE PLENARY SESSION THIS MORNING. ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES, THE WORK HAS BEEN USEFUL IN RESOLVING CERTAIN DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH AND FORM, AND, MORE IMPORTANT, HAS ASSISTED IN DEFINING AND REFINING THE ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE WHICH EXIST.

14. WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE PROCEEDED AT A MEASURED PACE, I DO NOT CONSIDER THAT THEY HAVE BEEN UNNECESSARILY PROLONGED. WE ARE DEALING WITH A COMPLEX PROBLEM WHICH HAS MANY FACETS AND I BELIEVE THAT PROGRESS, ALTHOUGH SLOW, HAS BEEN REASONABLY STEADY.

15. THIS CONCLUDES MY FORMAL PRESENTATION AND I WILL BE GLAD TO RESPOND TO ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE. UNQUOTEJOHNSON

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